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During the Implementation of a Strategic Initiative
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This qualitative study analyzes the decision-making process involved in adapting preconceived courses of action dur-ing the implementation of a strategic initiative. We observe that the type of decision-making process hinges on the
nature of managers’ emerging awareness of future events. When managers become aware of new uncertainty, the pro-
cess involves selectiveness, deliberateness, and diligence. By contrast, when managers become aware of new certainty,
the process conforms to the problem-solving adhocracy and decision-making messiness emphasized in prior literature.
We summarize our findings in a framework, proposing that decision-level differences in awareness and uncertainty can
explain the observed variation in strategic decision-making processes during implementation. We also discuss implications
for theory on procedural rationality and analytical comprehensiveness.
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Introduction
Strategic initiatives are special types of projects on which
organizations stake their future success. A strategic ini-
tiative constitutes a concerted effort toward “creating
or appropriating economic value from the environment,
which is organized as an independent project with its own
profit and loss responsibility” (Lovas and Ghoshal 2000,
p. 881). Ambitious, uncertain, complex, and consuming
a significant portion of organizational resources, strate-
gic initiatives offer an interesting setting for the study
of strategic decision making (Kaplan 2008, Lovas and
Ghoshal 2000, Pitsis et al. 2003).
Decision making here entails the challenge to cre-
ate appropriate courses of action in order to achieve
the stated goal of an initiative. Determining courses of
action up front offers some administrative control and
efficiency (Wiltbank et al. 2006), but not all information
useful for decision making is available from the out-
set. Adaptations during implementation become neces-
sary to align resource allocation plans with an evolving
set of available information. Strategic decision making
is thus a recurrent phenomenon, not a one-off exercise
(Brown and Eisenhardt 1997, Langley et al. 1995, Lewis
et al. 2002).
Empirical studies show that strategic decision making
during implementation is an important factor in deter-
mining project outcomes (Dvir and Lechler 2004, Lewis
et al. 2002), with managers trying to strike a balance
between following and adapting preconceived courses
of actions. Some particularly uncertain initiatives rely
almost entirely on adaptive decision making (Pitsis et al.
2003). However, despite its apparent significance, sur-
prisingly little is known about how managers actually
make individual adaptation decisions and how the pro-
cess of adapting during implementation differs from up-
front strategic decision making.
The context of adaptive decision making differs from
that of initial decision making in that implementation
activities make strong demands on managerial atten-
tion and increasingly lock in commitments (Quinn 1980,
Simon 1997). Prior research thus suggests that adaptive
decision making displays less procedural rationality than
decision making that precedes implementation. Adapta-
tions to original plans are often viewed as comparatively
ad hoc, serendipitous, and/or messy decisions (Cyert and
March 1992, Langley et al. 1995). In fact, more compre-
hensive decision making might be altogether impossible,
unless organizations invest significantly in its facilitation
by establishing an explicitly incremental mechanism for
resource allocation decision making (Grant 2003, Pitsis
et al. 2003). Beyond these general insights, we have lim-
ited knowledge of how managers decide to adapt and
how they effect an efficient middle course between stick-
ing to plans and learning by doing as they implement
strategic initiatives (see Lewis et al. 2002).
This theoretical gap matters in view of the fact
that key debates in the literature on strategic decision
making remain unresolved. One of the most impor-
tant of these debates concerns the role of environmen-
tal uncertainty in determining the relationship between
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procedural rationality/analytical comprehensiveness and
performance (Atuahene-Gima and Li 2004, Miller 2008).
Here, a study of adaptive decision making may provide
important insights. Greater environmental dynamism,
characterized by unpredictable markets, rapid technolog-
ical development, and competitive ambiguity (Davis et al.
2009, Hough and White 2003), makes it more likely that
a significant portion of strategic decision making will
occur during implementation, given the risk of premature
up-front commitments to any particular courses of action.
By neglecting adaptive decision making, or ignor-
ing the ways in which it differs from strategic decision
making prior to implementation, the comprehensive-
ness debate may be missing something important. For
instance, up-front decision making occurs within a com-
pact period of time, but adaptive decision making occurs
intermittently (Dvir and Lechler 2004). Strategic deci-
sion making during implementation is also constrained
by more irreversible commitments (Miller and Lessard
2008). Also, strategic decision-making styles during
implementation may display strong variation, with each
decision situated in a distinct evolving context (Lewis
et al. 2002, Pitsis et al. 2003). Research designs that
permit exploration of decision-making processes dur-
ing implementation at the decision level may therefore
reveal new insights into when and how procedurally
rational/comprehensive decision-making processes can
or cannot be employed.
Our aim is to address this research opportunity through
qualitative analysis of multiple decision episodes during
the implementation of a single strategic initiative. The
setting is conducive to analyzing strategic decision mak-
ing, because single initiatives are bounded in time and
scope, and individual resource allocation decisions, as
well as their determinants, are more readily demarcated.
For these reasons, prior studies of separate initiatives
have been useful in generating theory of strategic deci-
sion making (Kaplan 2008, Lewis et al. 2002, Lovas and
Ghoshal 2000, Pitsis et al. 2003).
Following best practice in qualitative research
(Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007), we chose the particu-
larly informative case of ALPHA, a very large initiative
launched by a group of companies. ALPHA was con-
ceived as a foray into the burgeoning telematics market,
and its immediate purpose was to establish an electronic
road-tolling solution. Concepts of interest to strate-
gic decision-making dynamics are particularly salient in
this case, including extensive planning horizons, capital
outlays, stakeholder complexity, and technological and
environmental uncertainty. ALPHA also represents a
conservative choice for the study of adaptation during
implementation; to prepare for the launch, the compa-
nies’ best managers considered a wide range of scenarios
in their efforts to devise courses of action for implemen-
tation so as to reduce as much as possible the need for
corrective decision making during implementation.
Among the 121 decision-making episodes we observed
at ALPHA, we identified three types of decision situ-
ations that managers faced during implementation. In
the first, managers responded to the resolution of uncer-
tainty that they had been aware of a priori. In the sec-
ond, they became newly aware of future events that they
perceived to be certain to occur, and in the third, they
became newly aware of future events that they perceived
as uncertain to occur. Across these three situations, we
observed variation in the degree of selectiveness, delib-
erateness, and diligence with which ALPHA made adap-
tation decisions. For instance, when ALPHA managers
became aware of a new event that they were confi-
dent would happen, episodes displayed the better-known
dynamics of problem solving and trouble shooting. This
was often an unstructured and messy process. However,
we discovered that the opposite was true in situations
when managers became newly aware of a future event
that they perceived to be uncertain. Here, the decision-
making process was more selective, deliberate, and dili-
gent, not unlike the process common in up-front decision
making. In situations where managers became newly
aware of possible future events, certain and uncertain,
ALPHA engaged in more substantial decision-making
processes than when additional information arrived con-
cerning future events of which they were already aware.
These insights are consolidated in a framework illus-
trating how managers switch between decision-making
styles during implementation. We propose that vari-
ation in selectiveness, deliberateness, and diligence—
key aspects of procedural rationality and analytical
comprehensiveness—is contingent upon whether man-
agers become newly aware of certain or uncertain future
events. We thus extend the concept of awareness to
strategic decision-making theory. We go on to suggest
that the common preference in this literature for aggre-
gate constructs of uncertainty and units of analyses
above the decision level is unlikely to render conclu-
sive results, given that awareness and uncertainty of a
decision-specific future event determine the decision-
making style used. Finally, we argue that during imple-
mentation, flexibility does not continuously decline as
previously suggested. The rationale for creating addi-
tional courses of future action continues to be based on
managers’ cost-benefit considerations of flexibility, even
though decision making is more constrained than prior
to implementation.
We begin by describing our qualitative methodology
and the focal strategic initiative. We then discuss mul-
tiple strategic decision-making episodes that occurred
after managers had become aware of new event possibil-
ities. From these we infer our main theoretical proposi-
tions regarding variability in decision-making processes
during implementation. We conclude by considering the
theoretical implications.
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Methods
Research Design
We motivate our research with the divergent results
of previous studies of core concepts such as ratio-
nality in strategic decision making under uncertainty.
In particular, we aim to address the lack of theory
about how organizations arrive at adaptation decisions
during implementation. An in-depth qualitative inquiry
into how such decisions are made seems appropriate to
our theory-building objective (Pratt 2009). Our setting
is a single organizational undertaking that we use to
study multiple embedded cases of decision making. This
research design enables us to harmonize the organiza-
tional context while allowing for useful variation in the
process of strategic decision making. Studying multiple
decision episodes permits replication where episodes are
treated as experiments, with each further episode serv-
ing to confirm or reject inferences drawn from previous
episodes (Eisenhardt 1989, Yin 1994). This approach
tends to provide more robust and generalisable the-
ory than single-observation inquiries (Eisenhardt and
Graebner 2007). Our unit of analysis is at the level of
individual decisions, and we distinguish between every-
day decisions and strategic decisions, the latter being
the focus of our study. Strategic decisions involved sub-
stantial and nonroutine resource allocations made by the
highest level of decision makers, creating waves of lesser
decisions (Dean and Sharfman 1996).
We chose to analyze decision making within the
clearly defined boundaries of a project initiative rather
than at firm level, where the strategic process is less
constrained. At the initiative level, timing and scope are
more clearly defined, and the overall objective is given.
Hence, decisions refer to the means to accomplish a
given goal, not the goal itself. Our choice is consistent
with recent studies that adopt single strategic initiatives
as a context for the study of strategic decision mak-
ing (Kaplan 2008, Lovas and Ghoshal 2000, Miller and
Lessard 2008, Pitsis et al. 2003).
Strategic initiatives are more independent, novel, com-
plex, and uncertain than the typical project an organiza-
tion might conduct (Loch et al. 2006, Lovas and Ghoshal
2000). They constitute the kind of high-stakes environ-
ment that allows for observation of senior-level deci-
sion making with far-reaching strategic implications. To
qualify as such, our sample project needed to be set
against an uncertain market environment, contain novel
approaches and technologies, and be sufficiently large
scale to provide a series of significant resource alloca-
tion decisions made over a longer period of time.
The ALPHA Initiative
The sample initiative ALPHA is the rollout of an elec-
tronic road-tolling scheme. ALPHA was founded as a
joint venture with three principal stakeholders (a mobile
telephony provider, an automotive company, and an
infrastructure firm) striving to enter the rapidly devel-
oping telematics market in the first few years after the
turn of the millennium. ALPHA trumped two rivals in
a competitive tender for the delivery of a nationwide
road-tolling system. The tender specified that the system
cover efficiently more than 10,000 km of motorways and
process nearly 1.5 million commercial vehicles. The sys-
tem was to assess each vehicle, collecting information
including the distance traveled, time of travel, emission
class, and number of axles, and to process these data in
a central monitoring and billing center. Other strategic
and technological decisions were left to the proposing
organizations.
The electronic road-tolling scheme was a critical
strategic initiative for ALPHA, designed to put its par-
ent organizations in a leadership position for future
road-tolling initiatives and for sales of add-on telemat-
ics products such as fleet management and other logis-
tics solutions. To facilitate this, ALPHA proposed an
ambitious technological solution for collecting the road
toll: the first large-scale linking of the satellite-based
global positioning system (GPS) and the global system
for mobile communication (GSM).
The initiative’s capital expenditure was projected to
be $1.1 billion. The outlays for the stakeholding busi-
nesses were equivalent to an average of 28% of their
respective annual investments, spread over three years.
Although seen primarily as a stepping stone into the
telematics market, ALPHA’s direct revenues were sub-
stantial in itself, anticipated as $550–$600 million per
year, shares of which constituted between 5% and 8% of
annual revenue at the relevant business units of the stake-
holding companies. ALPHA engaged approximately 500
personnel, excluding contractors. In addition, it collab-
orated with 19 major partners, supplying parts of the
in-vehicle hardware and software, booth installations,
enforcement gantries, and information technology (IT)
administration. In total, ALPHA spent two years plan-
ning the resource allocation for one year of implementa-
tion. Planning and implementation overlapped by three
weeks.
The rollout of a novel technology on an unprece-
dented scale in a new market entailed high unpredictabil-
ity, making ALPHA an ideal candidate for the study of
strategic decision making under uncertainty. Although
the replicability of the setting itself is limited, the nature
of the decision-making challenges faced by ALPHA is
comparable to that of other strategic initiatives in uncer-
tain markets. Most organizations with such goals as
introducing a new platform or suite of products, target-
ing a new market, or entering new partnerships need
to balance the competing demands of efficiently stable
delivery and the flexible adaptation of resource alloca-
tion plans to changing environments (Eisenhardt et al.
2010, Klingebiel 2010, Lewis et al. 2002). Strategic
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decision making is a central element in all of these ini-
tiatives, as is the danger of failing to recognize the entire
scope of future developments.
The focal decision-making body, herein referred to as
the planning and management group (PMG), consisted
of seven main members, three of whom changed dur-
ing the course of implementation. The PMG included
the chief operating officer and directors overseeing vari-
ous functional entities during implementation, including
finance, development, quality assurance, technology,
program management, and procurement and logistics.
All had held director-level positions at the parent com-
panies and had a good understanding of ALPHA’s orga-
nization. Realizing its strategic importance, departments
had sent some of their most respected managers to lead
the initiative. Most had worked in related business areas
such as fleet management or business network commu-
nications. Three had also had exposure to GPS and GSM
technologies. However, few had experience of imple-
menting a large-scale toll collection initiative, because
ALPHA was the first undertaking of its kind in the telem-
atics market. Such incomplete knowledge is common to
strategic initiatives rolled out in unknown terrain (Loch
et al. 2006, Mosakowski 1997). In its weekly meetings,
PMG made a series of strategic decisions with implica-
tions for resource allocation during implementation.
Data Collection
Our study tracks strategic decisions made during the
12 months of implementation, which demarcated the
context of adaptive decision making. Prior to that,
ALPHA had started out with a two-year period of exten-
sive deliberation of the courses of action that could be
taken during implementation. Whereas up-front decision
making devised resource allocation from scratch, adap-
tive decision making revised and added to preconceived
courses during implementation. We thus define adap-
tive decision making as managerial choices to reallo-
cate resources, or to allocate additional resources, during
implementation (Quinn 1980). This definition is consis-
tent with recent empirical observations in this area (e.g.,
Pitsis et al. 2003) and provides a distinct but sufficiently
broad lens to generate a rich and longitudinal under-
standing of adaptation. It allows for a variety of rea-
sons for adapting prior plans: managers may learn, for
example, of new customer preferences, market potential,
technological feasibility, or operational difficulties.
Before starting full data collection, the lead author
spent four months with a professional services firm that
provided ALPHA with risk management advice. Gath-
ering contextual data and talking to these consultants
helped us develop an initial understanding of the par-
ticular nature of decision challenges associated with the
road-tolling initiative. Subsequently, we relied on two
sources of primary data: documents and interviews from
inside and outside ALPHA.
Internal documents included detailed accounts of
resource allocation decisions, generally in the form of
minutes, reports, and presentations. We complemented
these internal accounts with three major reviews con-
ducted by different advisory firms. In addition, we
regularly searched for media reports about topical man-
agement challenges, using the name of the organization
as the keyword in Factiva. In total, we accessed 4,700
pages of documents (see Table 1).
We used this extensive archival material to catalogue
developments that could impact implementation of the
ALPHA initiative. The catalogue provided the initial
structure for systematic decision-specific inquiry. For
example, we determined when decision makers started
to consider responding to developments and how long it
took them to decide to make or not make changes. Docu-
ments also allowed us to track such boundary conditions
as the composition of the decision-making team and the
volume of issues arising at any one time. We then looked
at how decision making was conducted. Reports, presen-
tations, and minutes elucidated, for example, the range
of decision alternatives that PMG considered and the
amount of search effort commissioned. Interviews cor-
roborated such documentary information and added fur-
ther detail on managerial perceptions of likelihood and
impact of decision-centric developments.
To gain access to informants, we contacted two mem-
bers of ALPHA’s main decision-making board, the
PMG. They helped to identify informants with insight
into emerging decision-making challenges. Our main
interviewee selection criteria were continued involve-
ment throughout the initiative and direct exposure to the
particular decision challenge. We sought to obtain a vari-
ety of perspectives by interviewing staff from different
functions and hierarchies. In addition, we interviewed
external informants, including former employees, com-
petitors, contractors, and industry experts (see Table 1
for informants’ backgrounds and the typical number of
informed respondents per decision episode). We used
multiple informants to limit the risks of perception bias,
retrospective sensemaking, and impression management
(Gibbert et al. 2008). Multiple informants provided
a richer understanding of phenomena, as individuals
focused on complementary aspects of major decision
challenges (Eisenhardt 1989).
Each interview lasted between 45 and 150 minutes.
Interviews were semistructured and began with open-
ended questions about the background to each deci-
sion challenge. We then focused on facts, events, and
direct assessments, including decision chronologies and
the rationale employed. Finally, we triangulated archival
information with interviewee interpretations, for exam-
ple, of the relative importance of new developments
in the environment. The content of the interview ques-
tionnaire evolved iteratively (following Eisenhardt and
Graebner 2007); the responses of initial interviewees
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Table 1 Overview of Data and Selected Sample Decision Challenges
Informants Documents
Internal External Internal External
Sources
PMG members Competitors PMG presentations Risk reviews
Program leaders Former employees Budget worksheets Media reports
Heads of work streams Contractors Gantt charts Regulatory reviews
Risk managers Industry experts Milestone reports Analyst briefings
Others Risk reports
Workstream agendas
Quantity
31 hrs 11 hrs 187 docs/3,800 pages 65 docs/900 pages
Sample vignettes of Sources relating to
Episode selected decision challenges each challenge
Informants Documents
F ALPHA indentified and evaluated a large number of risks prior to start of execution. One related
to potential hiccups in the integration of in-vehicle electronics, roadside enforcement
equipment, mobile communications, and central data management. PMG set aside significant
human resources for the possibilities of integration disruptions. During implementation, heads
of work streams reported to PMG, mounting delays resulting from component integration.
17 31
E After seven months and increasing delivery ramp-up of project elements, PMG received an
urgent communiqué from one of ALPHA’s foreign suppliers of onboard unit equipment. It
revealed that there had been financial difficulties for some time and that insolvency was
imminent. Supplier default would have meant significant disruptions to testing and installation
schedules.
8 9
D Midway through execution, there was increasing indication that an electronic element of the
in-car transponder could be prone to overheating. This was in addition to numerous other
technical risks anticipated prior to execution. An unfavorable scenario included the media
picking up on reports of some few failed onboard units (out of millions delivered), denting
ALPHA’s quality image. This could have endangered both contract extension and follow-on
projects in neighboring markets. ALPHA considered these possibilities after a testing team
reported the risk of overheating to PMG.
6 11
C Seven months into implementation, growing public concern over data security became the
source of a new uncertainty. ALPHA had anticipated that a road-charging scheme could give
grounds for consumer resentment, including legal charges, and had taken pains to address
these concerns through a public relations team. PMG did not, however, expect extensive
press coverage of data security concerns. Haulage unions now had another argument on the
grounds of which to threaten boycott. Two PR assistants reported this issue to PMG, who then
considered this uncertainty during its weekly meeting. The downside scenarios included
transport firms ignoring electronic tolling, using the manual booths instead. The system could
not serve all drivers through manual tollbooths. A boycott would have caused severe
slowdowns or a complete stop of traffic flow.
12 28
B In an effort to make electronic road-charging systems interoperable across neighboring
countries, transport departments discussed the creation of a common standard. This
diverged from ALPHA’s prediction that the advanced GPS system would crowd out older
alternatives, i.e., microwave-based technologies. GPS allows governments to price their entire
road infrastructure seamlessly while being able to distinguish more fairly between different
usage characteristics. However, an unanticipated delay in the launch of the European Galileo
satellite network, which would have reduced bottlenecks in the availability of U.S.-run GPS
services, had the potential to tilt regulators’ technology preference. If neighboring countries
adopted microwave technology, ALPHA’s competitive advantage would diminish. PMG started
to discuss such scenarios after a lobbyist reported back about this uncertainty.
9 23
A Shortly after implementation plans were finalized and execution began, the runner-up bidder for
the road-charging contract launched legal proceedings on grounds unanticipated by ALPHA.
While ALPHA had made some provision for covering penalty threats, for example, over
system design, a court suit over the fairness of the government’s awarding procedure had not
been part of any planning scenarios. Concerns were raised over the fairness and
transparency of grant allocation procedures. One PMG member, who was also part of the
steering group, was in regular contact with the ministry over the implementation progress. He
was the first to hear that lawyers representing a rival bidder had filed an information request in
preparation for a court suit. In the PMG meeting that followed, the probability of a substantially
negative court ruling was discussed formally for the first time. An unfavorable court decision
could have meant penalty payments on the grounds of ALPHA’s alleged involvement.
8 17
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Figure 1 Emerging Concepts
Discussed event possibility
Event was part of initial risk assessment
Multiple mentions made in planning exercise
Event
uncertainty
known prior to
execution
Knowledge
of decision-
centric event
Event posed “roadblock”/would definitely happen
Not expected, event perceived as surprise
PMG did not mention it/no discussion ex ante
Event
recognized as
certainty during
execution
Came to think of new factors and scenarios
New information stimulated thinking about
“what else could happen”
Considered additional possibilities
Event
recognized as
uncertainty
during execution
Did not apply standard decision rules
Decided adaptation as appropriate
Approach to decision meetings varied
SDM approach
characterized by
selectiveness
Procedural
rationality/
comprehen-
siveness
Intended to make specific decision
Was fully aware of what we were doing
Chose to do it/not do it
SDM approach
characterized by
deliberateness
Applied excessive care in information gathering
Checked assumptions multiple times
Compared/vetted many proposals
Considered probability in estimates
SDM approach
characterized by
diligence
Informant/first-order concepts Second-order concepts Aggregate constructs
allowed us to sharpen our emphases in subsequent inter-
views. Whereas there were differences of opinion, there
was a consensus on factual matters across these differ-
ent data sources. Informants, especially external ones,
also often revealed complementary information, which
allowed us to construct richer histories of focal decision-
making episodes.
Overall, our study of internal and external documents
and interviews provided detail on 121 decision episodes.
Each episode comprised a series of activities pertain-
ing to a decision challenge. As in prior works (Langley
et al. 1995, Simon 1997), episodes included a decision-
making process with stimulation and framing, informa-
tion gathering, sensemaking, design of alternatives, and
choice, although these varied in character and intensity.
Processes often overlapped, and an episode could last
from 1 week to 38 weeks, the average duration being
6 weeks and the median being 5 weeks.
Analysis
We began by analyzing each individual episode, concen-
trating on aspects of our research question: How do man-
agers make adaptation decisions during implementation?
We started with few prior theoretical hypotheses or pref-
erences. The purpose was to identify constructs, relation-
ships, and patterns, which we abstracted in tables and
graphs to facilitate analysis (Miles and Huberman 1994).
Thus, we developed an understanding of the decision-
making process for adaptation, occasionally going back
to informants for clarification. We then moved to open
coding, based on informant narratives. We identified first
sets of salient concepts in the data and grouped them
into categories. Simple summary phrases of the central
concepts are depicted in Figure 1. Moving from discov-
ery to enrichment and validation, we searched for rela-
tionships among our categories and ordered them into
second-order concepts. These were grouped into overar-
ching dimensions that are central for our emergent theo-
retical framework. We engaged in recursive, rather than
linear, analysis, using additional interviews for poten-
tial disconfirmation until we had a clearer grasp of the
emerging constructs.
We then conducted cross-case analysis to identify
variation across episodes in different situational contexts
(Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). We started with paired
comparisons and added episodes to check for the robust-
ness of each proposed construct relationship. We used a
simple ranking system (1 = low to 5 = high) to gauge
the extent to which episodes displayed evidence of the
constructs, applying it to both interview and documen-
tary material (see Tables 3–5 for detail on distribution).
Analyzing theoretical constructs across these categories,
we cycled between emerging theory, data, and literature
to clarify our contributions. The analysis period lasted
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eight months and led to the development of theoretical
propositions regarding strategic decision making (SDM)
during the implementation of an initiative. Our find-
ings are illustrated with qualitative detail from six exem-
plarily well-documented decision episodes (see Tables 1
and 2). Sample quotations, rating distributions, and sim-
ple summary statistics for the 121 decision episodes are
displayed in Tables 2–5. This approach allows readers
both to appreciate the qualitative richness of the data
and to view it in context of the entire sample of decision
episodes.
Results
Our data suggest that the character of strategic deci-
sion making during implementation differs across three
types of situations. In situations where uncertainty1
resolved around particular events of which managers
were previously aware, ALPHA’s strategic decision-
making response was as predicted in the existing lit-
erature. For most critical uncertainties known ex ante,
up-front planning had prepared contingencies that were
later used when needed. Although constrained by the
usual stakeholder dynamics, the PMG made decisions
to adopt preconceptualized alternative courses of action
in a straightforward manner, operating within precon-
structed frames of mind; only moderate modifications
were made to predeveloped action scenarios.
The opposite was true for decisions made in response
to newly perceived barriers to implementation. When
ALPHA’s decision makers perceived future events, i.e.,
new certainties, of which they had previously been
unaware but which could significantly impact delivery,
they responded through problem solving, trouble shoot-
ing, and crisis management. Awareness of a new certain
event often halted or suspended some ongoing imple-
mentation activities because these would be directly
impacted by any impending plan change decision. The
sense of urgency and pressure this created for decision
making led to relatively hectic consideration of alterna-
tives and less comprehensive adaptation decisions.
A third pattern of decision making prevailed when the
PMG became aware of new events that were still uncer-
tain. When decision makers became aware of new uncer-
tainty, they embarked on a more procedurally rational
process to decide whether they ought to create further
alternative courses of action. Although newly recog-
nized uncertain events tended to be more distant than
newly recognized certain events, it was more the fact that
potential plan changes would not directly alter ongoing
implementation activities that allowed for an analytically
comprehensive approach to adaptation. Here, strategic
decision making was selective, deliberate, and diligent.
In the following sections, we detail how selective-
ness, deliberateness, and diligence vary across decision
situations. We focus particularly on situations where
managers become aware of either a new certainty or a
new uncertainty. Each description is framed with a brief
overview at the beginning and a theoretical contextual-
ization at the end.
Selectiveness
Overview. We observed variance in how selective
managers went about adaptation. Here, the concept
selectiveness encompasses the ability to distinguish
and discriminate amongst decision situations, designing
decision-making responses accordingly. Such selective-
ness in adaptation indicates contingency; selective adap-
tation means that the strategic decision-making approach
varies with the decision challenge at hand, rather than
following a preprogrammed organizational tendency to
always accept or reject adaptation.
From our data, we infer that when management
becomes newly aware of certain roadblocks to deliv-
ery, they have a limited array of choices; staff tend
to engage in troubleshooting efforts to save implemen-
tation. Conversely, when managers become aware of
new uncertainty, they investigate and selectively decide
whether or not to change implementation plans. Man-
agers’ responses to the resolution of uncertainty known
up front are also selective.
Description. Prior to implementation, ALPHA had
conducted extensive risk management and scenario
refinement exercises: several rounds of environmental
screening identified and prioritized a set of uncertainties
and scenarios. One respondent noted,
Can’t remember any initiative [for which] we spend
more time and resources on risk management 0 0 0 0 Clever
people1 0 0 0bubble diagrams1 0 0 0prioritizations, and repri-
oritizations 0 0 0 I mean endless.
In preparation for uncertainty resolution, the PMG
decided on a number of alternative courses of action.
For example, ALPHA anticipated potential failures in
the harmonization and system integration of the vari-
ous partner deliveries (Episode F). In preparation, the
PMG increased the resources dedicated to integration
testing and devised parallel plans for a system start with
partially integrated features. In other cases, the PMG
decided that either the probability of occurrence or the
magnitude of impact were too insignificant to justify the
preemptive creation of alternative courses of action.
Extensive scenario reviews and preparation were
intended to reduce the scope for hitches during imple-
mentation. This was alongside a proactive effort in
public relations and stakeholder negotiations to create
a generally favorable implementation environment and
reduce the spectrum of surprises along the way. Never-
theless, despite the concerted effort, not all contingencies
could be foreseen.
Several short-term crises arose. For example, in
Episode E, a foreign supplier of parts for the onboard
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unit announced it was going into administration because
of a liquidity impasse. The news of the impending
delivery shortage now started to perturb implementation
activities even before the supplier finally ceased deliv-
eries. Ramifications for ALPHA were such that the new
event could not be ignored and implementation plans had
to be adapted, either through savings or by switching
suppliers. A PMG member recalled,
I don’t think there was a choice 0 0 0 0 This thing was
too 0 0 0big. We just had to act.
In most of the episodes reported by interviewees and
recorded in documents in which decision makers became
aware of new certainty, adaptation was a quasi-automatic
event. Not so, however, when managers realized the
existence of additional uncertainty.
ALPHA’s management learned of a pending court
case (Episode A) through a PMG member who had
informal links to the contracting authority. Once this
possibility was identified, the PMG discussed the issue
at its weekly meeting and assigned two employees—one
with a legal background and the other with a project
management background—to search for information and
to assess potential impact scenarios. This complemented
a parallel analysis conducted by risk consultants. Man-
agers felt that the court ruling could have significant
financial implications for implementation and were anx-
ious to assess its likelihood and find ways to minimize
negative performance implications. The following state-
ment from a project associate is typical of many of the
comments received from system experts:
[M]anagement felt that the possible loss through [a] court
[ruling] had to be reduced. After all, it could affect 10
years of operations 0 0 0 0 [R]isk consultants’ assessments
of impact ranges and likelihoods indicated that the impact
could be dramatic. So, there was an active search for
possible ways to restructure the partner portfolio and to
renegotiate existing service contracts [for mobile com-
munication transmission].
In this case, the PMG decided to incur the costs of
reopening some contract agreements to put in place half-
yearly opt-out clauses. This simplified compliance with
a possible court ruling that would allow services to be
subcontracted, instead of paying fines. In another exam-
ple (Episode C), new uncertainty emerged at a late stage
of implementation. A number of haulage associations
announced their intention to boycott the electronic pay-
ment system and use manual payment facilities instead,
creating lengthy traffic jams. Their action would lead
to an elegant collapse of the system, without the truck-
ers breaking the law by not paying road tax. The threat
gained unprecedented weight as data security worries
were publicized, jeopardizing the launch of the system.
A risk analyst summed up the situation:
Towards the end, there was a lot of [public] frustra-
tion about the increase in road transportation costs.
The haulers in particular would not stop complaining
about data security, although [ALPHA] had no influence
on the real issue, the [road usage] pricing level 0 0 0 0 Many
contingencies were explored, but 0 0 0 it was not possible
to change the tollbooth layouts. So, just in case, legal
efforts and data security preparations were stepped up.
Toward the end phase of the rollout, many resource
commitments had become indivisible and irreversible.
However, the search for information and the exploration
of alternative courses of action led to an eventual deci-
sion to change data transfer and storage specifications.
Minimal additional investments in hardware and soft-
ware infrastructure provided the flexibility to convert
data-handling mechanisms at more acceptable costs if
and when consumer protests required it.
Awareness of new uncertainties did not always result
in plan adaptation. When increasing evidence from the
on-track testing team showed that a small but potentially
significant number of onboard units were prone to over-
heating, the PMG made no alterations in anticipation of
this potential problem. The new uncertainty had been
discussed in the weekly PMG meeting and further inves-
tigated by a team of two engineers and a risk manager.
The head engineer from the onboard unit team stated,
The consensus was that 0 0 0unless we know for sure that
these hot circuit boards made a sizable impact on system
performance 0 0 0we’d rather not cause disruptions to the
delicate network of technology suppliers.
The PMG board decided to act and create alternative
courses of action on 8 of the 19 occasions when they
became aware of new uncertainty. On 11 occasions, the
PMG decided to wait and see before adapting implemen-
tation plans. See Table 3 for further sample quotations
on selectiveness and on the respective ratings of decision
episodes. A simple t-test shows that the mean rating of
selectiveness was significantly lower in situations where
new certainty was recognized than in situations where
uncertainty was recognized.
Interpretation. In sum, our observations of ALPHA’s
responses to newly recognized uncertainty suggest that
adaptive decision making does not follow a predeter-
mined pattern of adapting or sticking to plans. Instead,
new developments are considered on a case-by-case
basis. Awareness of new uncertainty appears to trig-
ger a decision-making process specific to the emerging
challenge.
If ALPHA had consistently relied on up-front deci-
sion making, we would have expected managers, once
they had recognized additional uncertainty, to wait for its
resolution or respond through problem solving and pos-
sibly crisis management (e.g., Cyert and March 1992).
Conversely, if ALPHA’s decision-making behavior had
been strongly adaptive, planning only short term and
on the fly, we would not have seen as much evidence
of prior up-front planning (Pitsis et al. 2003, Wiltbank
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et al. 2006). Instead, we observed managers making
selective decisions to amend strategic plans in some
instances but not in others.
ALPHA also did not engage in institutionalized plan-
ning reviews or other regular routines that could point
toward a decision-making approach of planned emer-
gence (Grant 2003). There is little indication that
ALPHA introduced a priori measures that paralleled
activities or allowed for specific experimentation, as
it could have done in expectation of future uncer-
tainty recognition (Sommer et al. 2009). ALPHA picked
and chose decision-making tactics depending on the
challenge at hand, rather than favoring a single predomi-
nant approach. This points to greater selectivity in adap-
tive decision making than is currently suggested in the
literature. Although we did not have reliable information
to assess and compare the degree of available resource
slack and managerial attention across the decision con-
texts, these factors may have influenced the selective-
ness of adaptation and could inform the design of future
research in this area.
Concluding our analysis of selectiveness, we offer the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. Selectiveness in adaptive decision
making is higher when managers become aware of
new uncertainty than when they become aware of new
certainty.
Deliberateness
Overview. In addition to our finding that decision
makers were more selective about adaptation in some
decision-making situations than in others, we also found
variation in the degree to which decisions to adapt
or not to adapt were deliberate. Here, deliberateness
means intentionality in decision making with manage-
rial consciousness of decision consequences. If deci-
sion makers become aware of new certainty, our data
indicate that responses tend to be reflexive or to develop
their own crisis management dynamic. In cases where
decision makers become newly aware of future events
that are still uncertain and sufficiently distant, our data
reveal that responses in the form of designing additional
courses of future action result from a conscious choice to
consider the advantages and disadvantages of adaptation.
The deliberateness exerted in such decision situations
seems comparable to that observed during ALPHA’s up-
front planning exercise.
Description. For Episode A, interview testimonies
and documentary material suggest that management
carefully considered the potential costs and benefits of
altering plans to allow for a switch of telecommunica-
tions service providers, preferring this alternative to miti-
gation (increased legal and lobbying effort) or immediate
plan corrections (seeking an out-of-court settlement by
offering a GSM contract share). The costs of adaptation
were the negotiation of flexible opt-out clauses, achieved
through somewhat higher compensation for reduced pur-
chasing volumes and shorter contract periods. These
change costs were more transparent and less daunting
than they might have been, because the original sup-
plier of choice for mobile telecommunication services
was part of the holding organization of one of ALPHA’s
main shareholders. These costs were discussed in the
PMG meeting and compared to the potential costs of
reversing commitments at a later stage and a court fine.
A decision was reached within three weeks of the point
of uncertainty recognition. A member of the PMG chair-
man’s team stated,
Subcontracting was not accidental 0 0 0XX and YY, in par-
ticular, underlined its purpose 0 0 0 to open up avenues to
deal with the [judicial] decision efficiently [at least] com-
pared to the alternatives at the time.
Willful and directed decision making was also evident
in the response to realizing a shifting regulatory prefer-
ence for internationally interoperable technologies. This
statement from a representative of an ALPHA supplier
is indicative of the deliberateness of the decision making
and its prior assessment of decision alternatives:
We imagined the majority of our business as eventu-
ally coming from extensions [to the current system] and
from abroad 0 0 0 0 Around half of our profits for the next
decade were in jeopardy [as a result of the pending leg-
islation]. Our contractor [ALPHA] slowly expanded the
supplier network with specialist companies, in order to
start exploring microwave technologies. We hoped that a
proportion of our expertise could still be leveraged onto
that platform 0 0 0 in time.
Building interoperability into the system at this stage
in the strategic initiative life cycle was not the only
alternative available. ALPHA could have accepted the
risk of an unfavorable regulatory recommendation. This
would have implied bidding for future awards without
microwave functionality in its existing system, upgrad-
ing its system at a later point, or bidding for awards
in countries not governed by the ruling. ALPHA used
internal and external expertise to assess the range of
probable revenue impacts resulting from an unfavorable
ruling. The PMG came to the conclusion that to protect
its future revenues, conditions for the potential sourcing
of microwave-based onboard units from an outside sup-
plier should be agreed upon, and small-scale tests should
be started. This relatively swift information-gathering
and decision-making process was a small step toward
a potentially significant modification of resource alloca-
tion plans, which required enhanced relationship man-
agement with several stakeholders.
In this situation, ALPHA could also have used emer-
gency slack resources, as it did when dealing with
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the challenges arising from the supplier’s failure to
deliver in-vehicle equipment. It could have used addi-
tional resources to step up its lobbying efforts to influ-
ence regulatory technology preferences or transferred
resources from the development of GPS technology to
building expertise in the microwave area. The last alter-
native in particular, however, would have meant serious
cost implications at a time when future developments
were unclear.
Much less deliberate were a number of responses to
the realization of new certainty. Smaller problems relat-
ing to the positioning of manual tollbooths and initial
difficulties with video-based enforcement solutions were
dealt with before news even reached the PMG. Similarly,
the strategic decision to switch an onboard unit supplier
in response to its pending insolvency was an obvious
or only-sensible-option adaptation that involved no addi-
tional degree of deliberation. The employee responsible
for the onboard unit work stream noted,
Of course, a formal decision of this magnitude rested
with [PMG], but no one really believed they could make
us try something else.
Sometimes, for example, when the media uncovered
an internal management dispute, mitigation was a rela-
tively chaotic affair; actions were taken that with more
careful consideration would not have been chosen. In
sum, both interviews and documentary materials were
consistent in showing that the strategic decision-making
style in response to new certainty was measurably less
deliberate than that in response to new uncertainties. For
more sample quotations and ratings, see Table 4. Com-
parable to situations with uncertainty known a priori,
decision making in situations where new certainty was
realized has a significantly lower mean deliberateness
than decision making in situations where new uncer-
tainty was realized.
Interpretation. Our observation that strategic deci-
sion making is triggered by the recognition of new
uncertainty deepens our understanding of how adapta-
tion occurs in reality. In situations such as Episode E
(new certainty), decision making is messy, intuitive, and
ad hoc, as suggested in the literature (Langley et al.
1995). However, when uncertainty emerges sufficiently
in advance of a potential event, organizations may opt
to conduct searches to establish probabilities of occur-
rence and to assess decision alternatives. This process is
somewhat constrained by limited managerial attention, a
lack of information, and a general stakeholder preference
for stable implementation. Despite these constraints,
ALPHA’s deliberate assessments of adaptation possibil-
ities suggest procedural rationality in decision making.
This finding complements research that stresses the hap-
hazard nature and serendipity of adaptation (Langley
et al. 1995, Mintzberg et al. 1998). Decision makers
often learn of the potential of future events before they
are certain to occur, which means that decision-making
processes start in advance of the troubleshooting that
scholars have suggested as the principal mechanism for
adaptation. Such early-stage recognition triggers a more
deliberate decision-making process.
Concluding our analysis of deliberateness, we offer
the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Deliberateness in adaptive decision
making is higher when managers become aware of
new uncertainty than when they become aware of new
certainty.
Diligence
Overview. In addition to selectiveness and deliberate-
ness, we investigate a third aspect: diligence. Diligence
here refers to a careful, assiduous, and conscientious
effort to establish the information that underpins strate-
gic decisions. Our case data confirm that in times of
crisis, adaptation often constitutes ad hoc decision mak-
ing. When decision makers become aware of certain
acute problems, there is limited room for maneuver-
ing, and pressure mounts as implementation activities
start to expect plan changes. Strategic decision mak-
ing here lacks the diligence displayed in the planning
period prior to implementation. There are, however, fre-
quent incidences in which strategic decision making is
contemplative and conscientious—namely, when deci-
sion makers recognize uncertain events of which they
were previously unaware. In response to new uncer-
tainty, managers consider the costs and benefits of cre-
ating additional courses of future action that provide
flexibility for eventual uncertainty resolution. They thus
modify resource allocation plans without committing to
definite changes. These modifications are less directly
disruptive to ongoing implementation and decided upon
relatively diligently, in an attentive, careful, and assidu-
ous manner.
Description. For example, in Episode A, the PMG
was confronted with the new possibility of a change
in regulatory preference for technological standards that
would be interoperable across borders (Episode B). The
PMG could opt either to wait and see the outcome of
the regulatory working group’s recommendation or to
prepare for a still uncertain outcome. One likely neg-
ative outcome was the nonbinding recommendation for
a rival technology based on microwave transmission.
To assess whether it was worth preparing for this sce-
nario in advance, given its potential for disruption to
ongoing activities, PMG commissioned staff to conduct
basic Excel-sheet assessments. These estimated the dif-
ference between the impact of late plan changes and the
probability-weighted impact of early preparation. The
PMG ultimately agreed that the costs of advance prepa-
ration (exploration and tests of add-on components to
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the onboard unit, allowing for technological compati-
bility) would be lower than a probability-adjusted cost
figure for a future ad hoc accommodation of an unfa-
vorable resolution of uncertainty. The PMG chose to
develop compatible components in advance and to nego-
tiate better prices for potential supplies early on, because
the need for supplies then was less pressing and evident
to potential suppliers. In arriving at this decision, man-
agers considered possible consequences, such as stake-
holders’ impression that the ALPHA leadership was not
fully committed to the technology it had touted. The
PMG made a conscious attempt to compare the costs of
early contingency planning with the potential price of a
delayed response.
Although PMG could not accurately predict the value
of the additional flexibility provided by dual-technology
tests, an expert commented on the implicit rationale of
the decision process:
An endorsement of DSRC [i.e., microwave technology]
would be huge, but who knows if this is to come true 0 0 0 0
Our guys are assessing it 0 0 0 0 Chances are high enough
to justify the extra expenditure [on complementing tech-
nological search]. [ALPHA] is in a much better position
to secure follow-on deals with it than without it.
Similar strategic decision-making diligence was evi-
dent when the PMG responded to other new uncer-
tainties. These included an episode in which the PMG
decided to make additional investments in hardware
and software infrastructure to provide the flexibility to
convert data-handling mechanisms at more acceptable
costs if consumer protests increased (Episode C). PMG
considered the certain costs and uncertain benefits of
preparing for additional courses of future action before
deciding to alter plans at this stage of delivery. Three
people spent two weeks exploring various decision alter-
natives. When the PMG finally opted to increase data-
handling capacity, most members felt this option would
address public concerns more effectively than the other
decision alternatives.
Less diligence was visible in the handling of the sup-
plier insolvency. The certainty of this event created a
sense of urgency for decision making because imple-
mentation activities depended on any impending plan
changes. Similarly, an unexpected delay in the delivery
of an IT component led the PMG to send emergency
reinforcements to its internal supplier unit, with little
diligence spent in the process (see Table 5 for sample
quotations and ratings). ALPHA routinely used previ-
ously allocated slack resources to patch over or circum-
vent such unexpected turbulence.
Decision making involving the realization of new
uncertainty, such as in Episodes A, B, and C, followed a
different mechanism. Here, the PMG justified additional
resource allocations to create flexibility; it anticipated
better performance if it prepared early against the conse-
quences of unfavorable uncertainty resolution. Different
combinations of internal and external expertise in legal,
risk, and change management were used to prepare argu-
ments for plan adaptations. In the case of the pending
court ruling, the preparatory change influenced close-
knit implementation activities more than the change fol-
lowing recognition of the potential switch in regulatory
preference in Episode B. For the latter, ALPHA estab-
lished a separate unit to explore microwave technology
that, for the time being, allowed all other implementa-
tion activities to proceed as normal, although indirect
costs accrued through the need for intensified stake-
holder management. The three uncertainties also differed
in resolution time. The uncertainty linked to litigation
was resolved during implementation, but regulatory and
consumer uncertainties were resolved only later. These
differences, however, seemed to matter only insofar as
they required different strategic considerations. In the
basic spreadsheet analysis, the PMG used estimates for
direct and indirect flexibility costs to varying parts and
time frames of the initiative and employed ratios to cap-
ture the relationship between probable flexibility benefits
and the collective adaptation effort required.
For example, in the case of potential litigation, the
PMG anticipated a negative ruling in 60% of the cases.
The forecasted impact would exceed the cost of creat-
ing a contingency by a factor of 3. The variability of
the impact cost—a fine—was seen to be within reliable
boundaries. Although the major factors considered in the
flexibility assessment did not allow for exact quantifica-
tion of cost–benefit trade-offs, such analyses guided the
final decisions in the three focal episodes where uncer-
tainty was newly realized. Across the sample, the mean
rating for diligence in such situations is significantly
higher than in situations involving new certainty.
Interpretation. The data indicate that when assess-
ing the merits of plan adaptation, decision makers not
only consider the pros and cons of change but also
prepare for possible plan changes at a later stage. The
choice between change and no change is largely a
choice between costs incurred sooner or later—although
early preparation may be cheaper, the event itself is an
uncertain future occurrence. This behavior is consistent
with the existing view that early preparation for possi-
ble future change reduces the eventual cost of change
(Brown and Eisenhardt 1997, Schoemaker 1993). As
commitments become increasingly irreversible, this has
been thought to occur predominantly in early planning
phases (Miller and Lessard 2008).
ALPHA appreciated the cost of incorporating addi-
tional flexibility into plans that were generally expected
to remain frozen for implementation. However, despite
commitments that became increasingly expensive to
modify as implementation proceeded, ALPHA consid-
ered possible plan alterations to allow preparation for
emerging uncertain events. To arrive at a decision,
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managers weighed the costs and benefits of creating
additional managerial flexibility. For example, ALPHA
assessed future payoff scenarios in deciding whether to
change, remain unchanged, or incorporate flexibility in
the face of the pending court ruling (Episode A). This
served to gauge the expected net benefit of creating the
possibility of switching supplier. Methodical ranking of
decision alternatives seems characteristic of ALPHA’s
selectiveness and deliberateness in emergent strategic
decision making.
Concluding our analysis of diligence, we offer the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 3. Diligence in adaptive decision making
is higher when managers become aware of new uncer-
tainty than when they become aware of new certainty.
Summary and Propositions
We depicted strategic decision-making processes occur-
ring during implementation. A high proportion of these
involve adopting preconceived alternative courses of
action—namely, in response to the resolution of uncer-
tainty that managers were aware of prior to implementa-
tion. Beyond this, however, we observed that managers
also deal with two different types of situations that
require the rethinking of initial plans during implemen-
tation, influencing in turn the decision-making process
adopted. In situations of the first type, managers become
newly aware of an implementation-relevant future event
that appears certain to occur. They then embark on a
problem-solving, crisis management-like process, mak-
ing definite changes to implementation plans. In the sec-
ond type, managers become aware of a future event that
is an uncertain possibility. Awareness of future events
that are recognized when still perceived as uncertain
can trigger a more structured and sophisticated decision-
making process. The central decision question here is
not whether to commit to changes in implementation
plans, but whether to create additional courses of future
action. Both types of decision situations were reported
with similar frequency, and their differences in the mean
ratings for our concepts of interest are all significant.
Table 6 provides an overview of these findings.
Although selectiveness, deliberateness, and diligence
are conceptually distinct features of decision making that
can occur in any combination, they covary across our
observed decision situations: known uncertainty (high),
Table 6 Decision Situations and Decision-Making Process Characteristics
Resolution of uncertainty New certainty realized New uncertainty realized
Decision situation that was known up front during implementation during implementation
Mechanism Contingent action Problem solving Contingency planning
Selectiveness High (discriminate) Low (indiscriminate) High (discriminate)
Deliberateness High (intentional) Low (automatic) High (intentional)
Diligence High (conscientious) Low (cursory) High (conscientious)
new certainty (low), and new uncertainty (high). On
a decision-episode level, the three concepts correlate
positively.2 Because they capture important dimensions
of higher-level conceptualizations of procedural rational-
ity and analytical comprehensiveness, our findings lead
us to the following summary proposition.
Proposition 4. Procedural rationality/analytical com-
prehensiveness in adaptive decision making is higher
when managers become aware of new uncertainty than
when they become aware of new certainty.
Discussion
Adaptive Decision Making
We provide a detailed study of the decision-making
processes that occur during the implementation of a
strategic initiative. Our insights contribute to theory of
adaptive decision making, revealing how managers actu-
ally make individual adaptation decisions, how this pro-
cess varies in procedural rationality, and how differences
in awareness and uncertainty provide some explanation
for this variance.
We go beyond the notion of strategic decision mak-
ing during implementation as less structured and com-
prehensive than preimplementation decision making and
planning (Cyert and March 1992, Langley et al. 1995).
Our results confirm that there are incidents of less
sophisticated problem solving but that this is gener-
ally restricted to situations in which managers have
to newly accept certain facts. The insight is that many of
ALPHA’s decision situations were instead of a different
nature and involved a surprisingly structured decision-
making process. In these instances, the levels of selec-
tiveness, deliberateness, and diligence were comparable
to those displayed in up-front decision making where
attention was not constrained by ongoing delivery.
A good part of decision makers’ time is taken up
by the mundane task of responding to the resolution
of uncertainty conceived prior to implementation. Here,
adaptation involves the relatively straightforward adop-
tion of alternative courses of action designed during
the initial planning period. By contrast, crisis-like prob-
lem solving prevailed when managers became newly
aware of certain future events. More importantly, how-
ever, we uncover a third type of decision-making pro-
cess that has generally been overlooked in the literature.
This process occurs when managers become aware of
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new uncertainty. We discover that this process differs
from that triggered by the realization of new certainty.
If managers become aware of the possibility, rather
than the inevitability, of a relevant future event, they
employ comparatively selective, deliberate, and diligent
decision-making processes. Both new certainty and new
uncertainty require decision makers to rethink imple-
mentation plans more substantially than in other deci-
sion situations during implementation. However, new
certainty often requires direct plan adaptations, whereas
new uncertainty allows for exploration of potential ways
of adapting plans.
The upshot is that not all strategic decision making
during implementation lacks the procedural rationality of
up-front decision making. Intermittent episodes of adap-
tive decision making in response to becoming aware of
new uncertainty display patterns similar to those associ-
ated with up-front planning. One difference is, however,
that during implementation, decision makers take into
account the increasing costs of reversing commitments.
Future researchers may find it worthwhile to investigate
the extent to which factors such as managerial atten-
tion, time to uncertainty resolution, and organizational
routines and norms make strategic decision making in
response to becoming aware of new uncertainty more or
less selective, deliberate, and diligent.
We summarize in Figure 2 the extent to which strate-
gic decision-making processes during implementation
Figure 2 Procedural Rationality in Evaluating Strategic Decision Alternatives
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are characterized by procedural rationality. The key
theoretical contingencies of this framework are aware-
ness of, and uncertainty about, a decision-centric event.
When managers are initially unaware, decision mak-
ing during implementation is relatively comprehensive
in confronting an uncertain future event—and less so in
confronting a certain event.
More broadly, the paper’s findings add to our under-
standing of how decision makers “transcend styles”
(Quinn 1980, p. 90) during implementation of strate-
gic initiatives in uncertain environments; demands for
flexibility require a decision-making style of frequent
plan adaptations, whereas demands for reliability require
stable implementations plans (Lewis et al. 2002). We
observed the covariance of managers’ awareness of a
future event with levels of comprehensiveness/rationality
(summarized in Figure 2). Although at the level of the
strategic initiative it looks as if ALPHA steered a mid-
dle course, our analysis at the decision level reveals
how managers alternate between adapting and maintain-
ing plans.
Through a comprehensive process of ex ante strategic
decision making, ALPHA aimed to define appropriate
courses of action to prepare for a range of important
future events. Managers were nevertheless obliged to
make strategic decisions during implementation. They
switched between decision-making styles in response to
becoming aware of previously unforeseen future events.
When the newly realized event was certain, decision
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makers displayed lower—and when the event was uncer-
tain, higher—levels of selectiveness, deliberateness, and
diligence. Faced with certain events, ALPHA devised
short-term changes to resource allocation plans. Faced
with uncertain events, ALPHA devised future courses of
action intended to accommodate new ranges of future
event possibilities. Decision-making styles thus varied
on a case-by-case basis.
Awareness in Strategic Decision Making
Our observation of how structured decision making
punctuates constrained ad hoc decision making dur-
ing the implementation of a strategic initiative provides
some empirical clarification of the ways in which aware-
ness changes decision-making dynamics. The concept
of awareness has found application in economic models
(Dekel et al. 1998, Modica and Rustichini 1994), and
management scholars stress its theoretical importance:
“The number of considerations that are potentially rel-
evant to the effectiveness of an organization design is
so large that only a few of the more salient of these
lie within the circle of awareness at any given time”
(Simon 1978, p. 8). Instead of being aware of an event
with a perceived probability of zero, the organization’s
main decision makers can be completely unaware of
a future state of the world, although it may be know-
able or known to some other member of the organiza-
tion (Lampel and Shapira 2001, Mosakowski 1997). By
depicting how decision making follows awareness, we
extend previous research efforts that showed how effec-
tive preparation for potential future surprises involves
setting aside slack resources for experimental or parallel
problem solving (Pich et al. 2002, Sommer et al. 2009).
Because decision makers do not only become aware
of new certainty that would trigger problem solving,
they do not always respond by drawing on contingent
slack resources. Instead, when they become aware of
new uncertainty, managers selectively design new con-
tingency plans, deliberately allocating resources to alter-
native future courses of action.
The microprocesses of decision making that occur
when managers recognize new uncertainty, including
the deliberate analytical assessment of decision-making
alternatives, resemble those traditionally associated with
prescriptive up-front decision making (see Wiltbank
et al. 2006). ALPHA displayed rational behavior in seek-
ing to reduce new uncertainty to risk and then decid-
ing on mitigation (cf. Miller 2007, based on Knight
1921). When new event possibilities were identified
(Knightian uncertainty), organizational search efforts
established probabilities of occurrence (Knightian risk)
and provided the basis for establishing decision alter-
natives and the ensuing procedurally rational decision
making.
Comprehensiveness and Rationality
Our findings also contribute to research on procedu-
ral rationality and analytical comprehensiveness. Proce-
dural rationality in strategic decision making refers to
the overall process of gathering and using information
to identify and select sensible means to reach a stated
goal (Cyert and March 1992, Dean and Sharfman 1996,
Simon 1997). Similarly, analytical comprehensiveness is
understood as systematic and targeted scanning and anal-
ysis in the process of arriving at particular decisions
(Fredrickson and Mitchell 1984, Miller 1987). Selec-
tiveness, deliberateness, and diligence capture important
dimensions of both concepts (Figure 1).
We contribute three insights to the debate about
the relationship between performance in dynamic envi-
ronments and rational/comprehensive decision making,
where research has found positive (Atuahene-Gima and
Li 2004, Goll and Rasheed 1997, Miller 2008), negative
(Fredrickson and Mitchell 1984, Hough and White
2003), or insignificant (Elbanna and Child 2007) cor-
relations. First, the aforementioned studies use aggre-
gate measures for environmental turbulence/uncertainty/
dynamism (except for Elbanna and Child 2007, who
complement this with a decision uncertainty construct).
We show that this practice ignores variation in awareness
and uncertainty surrounding individual future events
that impact strategic decision making. It is a man-
ager’s knowledge of particular decision-centric events,
as opposed to aggregate dynamism in a firm’s envi-
ronment, that determines the strategic decision-making
style employed. Greater aggregate levels may increase
the need for adaptive decision making during imple-
mentation, but they do not necessarily affect the ratio
of new certainty to new uncertainty perceived by man-
agers during implementation. In other words, the aggre-
gate level of uncertainty does not determine whether
managers apprehend new events as certain or uncertain.
We would therefore expect rational/comprehensive deci-
sion making to increase performance in dynamic envi-
ronments only when managers perceive a high proportion
of uncertainty. Conversely, firms in uncertain environ-
ments should deprioritize rationality/comprehensiveness
if managers apprehend most events only once they are
certain.
This brings us to our second insight. Previous
analyses, which have focused on the organizational level,
disregard the potential for decision-specific variation in
chosen decision-making processes (exceptions include
Dean and Sharfman 1996 and Hough and White 2003).
Our observations suggest that looking at central ten-
dencies may be insufficient to explain decision-making
effectiveness in uncertain environments. Instead, we
would expect better performance from organizations that
competently switch between styles of decision mak-
ing, depending on managerial awareness and uncertainty
about future decision-centric events. If future research
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confirms this conjecture, it will inform theory on when
and how to complement rational and intuitive modes
of decision making (Dane and Pratt 2007, Langley
et al. 1995).
Finally, studies of procedural rationality/comprehen-
siveness rarely distinguish between decisions made
before and during implementation. However, in more
unpredictable environments, more information emerges
only after the start of implementation, leading to more
adaptations of initial resource allocation plans. Occur-
ring frequently but fragmentally in evolving contexts and
with increasingly irreversible commitments, such deci-
sion making deviates from the model described in the
studies referred to above.
Flexibility in Implementation
With the possible exception of organizations with
extremely incremental approaches to planning, as
observed by Pitsis et al. (2003), earlier research tends
to assume that plans for executing strategic initiatives
remain flexible for a limited time only before becoming
fixed. This fixity is often implicitly viewed as a point of
no return. Miller and Lessard (2008) argue that, follow-
ing several iterations of generating alternatives for future
action, there comes a point when no further flexibility
should be created. At some point during implementa-
tion, reductions in strategic thrust, stakeholder friction,
and other costs of introducing additional flexibility out-
weigh the expected benefits (Ghemawat and Costa 1993,
Klingebiel 2010).
Our case analysis suggests that there are alternatives
to this view. Although the probability distributions of
known uncertainties narrow, requiring less flexibility
as implementation progresses, managers continue to
become aware of new uncertainties that may warrant
the creation of additional flexibility. The episodes we
observed suggest that the decision to create additional
flexibility varies from case to case, depending on the
new uncertainty in question and the expected costs and
benefits of potential plan modifications. ALPHA decided
to create costly additional flexibility when it renegoti-
ated a key supplier contract, because those costs were
still lower than the probability-weighted outlay required
by a potential court ruling. Late into implementation,
ALPHA also decided that it would be economical to cre-
ate additional flexibility by upgrading its data-handling
capacity, because this would impact only a small part of
the operation.
Our findings confirm that flexibility creation decreases
in intensity as project delivery approaches its target; the
costs of modifying planning commitments do indeed rise
with time (with varying intensity). However, our data
suggest that this reduction is not continuous. Managers
occasionally find that some emerging uncertainty renders
the benefits of creating additional flexibility greater than
its costs.
We also contribute by depicting the managerial ratio-
nale for creating additional courses of action during
ongoing implementation, which resonates with a grow-
ing body of research into managers’ appreciation of
the value of flexibility for decision making (Bowman
and Hurry 1993, Trigeorgis 1996). At ALPHA, the pro-
cess was triggered by emerging awareness of additional
uncertainty surrounding future events. The PMG’s rel-
atively diligent cost–benefit analyses were informed by
probabilistic estimates of the costs of a wait-and-see
approach versus preparation for uncertainty resolution.
ALPHA made selective decisions to incorporate addi-
tional alternatives for future courses of action, cognizant
of the (potentially unnecessary) costs associated. Con-
sistent with prior findings, we observed that the costs
of creating flexibility rise as implementation progresses,
because stakeholder commitments are increasingly irre-
versible (Miller and Lessard 2008). This does not imply,
however, that managers cease to recognize value in flex-
ibility; rather, it becomes increasingly unlikely that the
benefit of additional flexibility will exceed its costs.
Managerial Implications
Strategic initiatives such as ALPHA’s entry into the
telematics market are crucial undertakings intended to
secure future income streams. Because few such ini-
tiatives are successfully realized (Morgan et al. 2008),
our findings may provide helpful insights for execu-
tives charged with determining courses of action for
implementation.
We confirm that the ever-present possibility of
encountering new risks and problems requires scope to
extend original plans. The good news is that adapta-
tion may not always require regular replanning pro-
cesses or extensive buffers. Managers can be economical
about adaptation without compromising the benefits of
planning stability, such as strategic thrust, resource uti-
lization, and sourcing economies of scale. A policy of
planning as much as possible, in part by creating contin-
gencies for known uncertainties, and adapting as much
as necessary, by accommodating contingencies for newly
recognized uncertainties, leads to more efficient imple-
mentation. The effectiveness of this policy hinges on
an organization’s capacity to identify and evaluate the
varying costs and benefits of creating new alternatives
for future courses of action. This enables management
to respond to emerging uncertainties only when neces-
sary. Many organizations make use of this capacity for
risk management during the initial planning phases of
projects; the imperative is to ensure that it can also be
tapped during implementation.
The expectation is improved average long-term perfor-
mance. Implementation costs, running costs, and revenue
all benefit if an organization responds effectively to the
recognition of new uncertainty. This advantage reduces
the need for large lump-sum slack allocations to guard
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against future surprises; organizations can be more selec-
tive in matching resources to replanning needs. In addi-
tion to allocating slack funds for crisis response, firms
could also establish a budget for emergent strategic deci-
sion making in response to new uncertainties. Pairing
a leaner main budget with selective increases in avail-
able funds made available on a case-by-case basis would
enable managers to make provisions (only) when new
uncertainty has been recognized and deliberated. Fewer
resource demands per initiative will allow managers to
undertake more, or more uncertain, project initiatives,
because increased numbers of emerging opportunities
can be exploited and threats contained.
Limitations and Future Research
Our research naturally has limitations that should be
addressed through future research. First, we limited our-
selves to the study of a single strategic initiative. To
extrapolate, comparative work is needed on a greater
number and diversity of organizational undertakings,
including ventures with strategic objectives that are in
flux. Although we expect emergent managerial aware-
ness of critical future events, certain or uncertain, to be
a common phenomenon across initiatives such as new
product introductions and market entries, ALPHA’s high
levels of overall uncertainty, organizational complexity,
and publicity may have had an influence on the observed
managerial decision-making processes that might not be
observed in smaller, less constrained, or less scrutinized
initiatives.
Second, we encourage examination of factors that
might moderate strategic decision-making responses to
new certainty and new uncertainty. Although difficult to
measure, the time elapsed between event recognition and
adaptation might affect levels of selectiveness, deliber-
ateness, and diligence. Variation in the availability of
managerial attention during implementation could also
have a leveling effect on the observed differences in the
characteristics of strategic decision-making processes.
Finally, by moving beyond our present decision-level
focus, future research might isolate the effects of organi-
zational heterogeneity. Interesting variations include the
extent to which firms institutionalize incremental deci-
sion making or provide slack resources. We also sug-
gest exploring variation in the degree to which resources
are irreversibly committed to ongoing implementation
activities.
Conclusion
Our goal was to gain a greater understanding of strategic
decision making during implementation. We uncovered
a decision-making process ensuing when managers
become aware of new uncertainty, which is more pro-
cedurally rational than that ensuing when managers
become aware of new certainty. The model we offer sug-
gests that (un)awareness of the (un)certainty of future
decision-centric events can explain managerial switch-
ing between styles of adaptive decision making during
implementation.
By focusing on individual decision episodes, we
unpack patterns of adaptation and extend the concept of
awareness to strategic decision-making theory. Decision-
level variation in the level of awareness and uncertainty
raises questions about the use of aggregate constructs
for empirical research. We also offer detail on the non-
continuous decline of flexibility during implementation
and illuminate the ways in which managers consciously
weigh up the costs and benefits of creating additional
courses of future action. Together, these findings pro-
vide ample scope for future research on the managerial
reality of strategic decision making under uncertainty.
Acknowledgments
The authors acknowledge John Joseph, Martin Kilduff, Donald
Lessard, Stefan Scholtes, seminar participants at the University
of Southern Denmark, and three anonymous reviewers for their
constructive comments. The first author acknowledges finan-
cial support from the Economic and Social Research Council
[Grant PTA-026-27-1837].
Endnotes
1This is understood as Milliken’s (1987) perceived state uncer-
tainty, which is managers’ incomplete understanding of future
change in components of the environment. Conversely, cer-
tainty here indicates PMG managers’ confidence that a future
change will or will not take place.
2An increase of 1 in selectiveness is associated with an
increase of 0.34 in deliberateness and of 0.46 in diligence. An
increase of 1 in deliberateness is associated with an increase
of 0.38 in diligence, all at the 0.05 confidence level.
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